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YOU CAN BUILD A WALL OR DEPORT THEM, BUT YOU CAN’T TAKE
AWAY THEIR GUNS: AN ANALYSIS OF WHY NON-U.S. CITIZENS ARE
“THE PEOPLE” UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Andrew Figueroa∗
The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission
for the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and
resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to all people within our borders.1
—Supreme Court Justice Douglas
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution emphatically begins with a display of supremacy,
“We the people.”2 The phrase “the people” appears in several constitutional
clauses and most notably, appears in five amendments within the Bill of
Rights.3 Who are “the people?” Does the phrase “the people” refer to a
specific class of individuals or does it refer to all people within the United
States? Does “the people” carry the same meaning throughout the
Constitution or is the phrase defined differently in the context of the
particular clause in which it is textually located? The uncertainty of the
definition of “the people” was revisited in a recent circuit split regarding the
Second Amendment.4 The Second Amendment declares, “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”5 This amendment is
arguably the most controversial and misunderstood provision of the Bill of
Rights.6 With the more pressing questions of interpretations of the Second
Amendment, the courts have not gotten around to extending consideration
∗ J.D. Candidate, Florida International University College of Law, 2017; B.A., University of South
Florida, 2011. A special thanks to the editors of the FIU LAW REVIEW for publishing my Comment.
1
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Douglas, J., for the court).
2
Note, The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1078, 1078
(2013) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
3
Id.
4
See generally United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015).
5
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
6
Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 1
(1996); see also Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 640–41
(1989) (writing that the Second Amendment is the most ignored patch of text in the Constitution, outside
the Third Amendment, and is not at the forefront of scholarly discussion).
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to what class of individuals is afforded the right to bear arms.7
On August 20, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that illegal aliens8 and non-U.S. citizens are afforded
the protections of the Second Amendment as they are considered part of
“the people.”9 This decision created a circuit split as the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Circuits held that illegal aliens are not part of “the people” and thus,
not afforded the protections of the Second Amendment.10 Certainly,
banning illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens from possessing firearms seems
reasonable in the current context of the many tragic shootings and the
related gun debate. However, constitutional protections that are embedded
in our history and traditions should be carefully analyzed before a blanket
restriction is imposed on an entire class of individuals. Specifically, there
must be more to the discussion of their Second Amendment claims rather
than imposing an all-inclusive ban that is grounded on unspecified fear and
prejudice.
Since the beginning of the United States, the interpretation of the
Second Amendment has been highly controversial and deeply
controverted.11 However, the debate continues and after a review of
Supreme Court precedent and historical traditions, it is clear that the Second
Amendment’s reference to “the people” reaches beyond citizens of the
United States. Although uncertainty remains, this Comment concludes that
non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens, who have established substantial
connections12 with the community and have accepted societal obligations,
7
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right
to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1530–31 (2010).
8
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2495 (2012) (Federal law specifically
categorizes aliens based on their registered status); see also BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 899 (2d ed. 1987) (writing that the term illegal alien is not an “opprobrious
epithet” because it describes an individual who entered the country in violation of immigration laws).
9
See Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 672 (noting the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) was
upheld because the statute passed intermediate scrutiny).
10
See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Flores, 663
F. 3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011); see also
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012) (The Tenth Circuit declined to address
the question, but held on other grounds that this class of individuals were prohibited from possessing
firearms.).
11
Allen Rostron, Symposium: A Loaded Debate: The Continuing Battle over the Second
Amendment, 78 ALB. L. REV. 819, 828–30 (2015).
12
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66, 271 (1990) (The Court made
references to “sufficient connections,” “substantial connections,” and “previous significant voluntary
connection[s],” however, this Comment will follow the language of the Seventh Circuit’s “substantialconnections.”); see also Hon. Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture: Aliens and the Constitution, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 836 (2013) (noting that lower courts have used “sufficient, substantial, and
significant connections interchangeably” and there is no indication that the Verdugo-Urquidez Court
used these expressions to set out different standards).
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are part of “the people” under the Second Amendment and thus, are
afforded the right to keep and bear arms.
This Comment has a narrow scope as it only addresses whether nonU.S. citizens and illegal aliens are considered part of “the people” under the
Second Amendment.13 This Comment will not analyze the constitutionality
of statutes that regulate the right to possess firearms for non-U.S. citizens
and illegal aliens or the constitutional scrutiny that ought to be applied to
such regulations. Also, this Comment will not attempt to address the
current laws in relation to the existing gun debate. Those issues are left to
others.
This Comment is broken down into four sections: (1) a brief discussion
of the history of the Second Amendment, with an analysis of the scope of
the District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago
decisions and the influences of these holdings on the circuit split; (2) a
review of Supreme Court precedent regarding the definition of “the people”
within the Bills of Rights; (3) a summary of the decisions of the courts of
appeals with an emphasis on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion; (4) and an
analysis of why the Seventh Circuit is constitutionally correct and to be
preferred over the contrary decisions of the other circuits.14
I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
One of the most well-established and controversial American
traditions is recognized in the Second Amendment, the individual right of
“the people” to keep and bear arms.15 Much of the Second Amendment
scholarship raises conflicting views of who is afforded the right to bear
arms,16 and the amendment seems to have numerous faces, “each casting its
gaze in a different direction.”17 The historical uncertainty continues
because there is inconsistency among the courts of appeals as to who are the
13
See Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix at 8, United States v. MezaRodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3271), 2015 WL 636261 (writing, “The Second
Amendment encompasses undocumented aliens because they are, and always have been, part of ‘the
people’”) [hereinafter Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix].
14
See Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1165–70 (Although upholding the gun restrictions on an
illegal alien, the Tenth Circuit provided valuable insight on how to interpret the other circuit court of
appeals and the Heller Court.).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
16
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1542–43.
17
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, SECOND AMENDMENT (UPDATE) ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 2347 (Kenneth L. Karst & Leonard W. Levy eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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specific rightsholders entitled to this protection.18 However, no matter how
controversial the meaning of the Second Amendment is today, it was clear
enough to the drafters of the United States Constitution that the amendment
guaranteed “the people” the right to possess their private arms.19 In fact,
James Madison favored this interpretation and once assured the people that
they shall not fear the new federal government because of “the advantage of
being armed, which [they] possess over the people of almost every other
nation.”20
The right for people to bear arms is an American tradition with deep
Anglo-Saxon roots.21 During the colonial period, American culture
embraced the principle of private gun ownership.22 Much of this tradition
was brought from English values, traditions, and legal concepts.23 In fact,
as indicated by Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries, “[t]he subjects
of England are entitled . . . to the right of having and using arms for selfpreservation and defense.”24 This right was integrated in America as it was
the policy of most colonies to pass laws requiring all males to possess arms
and to serve in the local militia.25 The term “militia,” as used in the colonial
context, should take the meaning of all able-bodied men themselves.26 The
coextensive use of the term “militia” and all able-bodied men is due to the
necessity for each man to possess a firearm in order to report for duty and
achieve the security of the free state.27 As tensions developed between the
British Parliament and the colonies, the First Continental Congress
condemned Parliament’s actions and called upon the colonists to arm
themselves in defense against the British.28
After declaring independence from Great Britain and during the
American Revolution, Americans turned their focus to the task of drafting
state constitutions and declarations of individual rights for the new state
18

See Moore, supra note 12, at 801.
DON B. KATES, SECOND AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2346
(Kenneth L. Karst & Leonard W. Levy eds., 2d ed. 2000).
20
Don B. Kates & Alice Marie Beard, Murder, Self-Defense, and the Right to Arms, 45 CONN L.
REV. 1685, 1695 (2013) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, 269 (James Madison) (A.B.A. ed., 2009)).
21
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING (2d ed.
2008) [hereinafter FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING].
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE
FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769 (1979).
25
FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21.
26
Levinson, supra note 6, at 647.
27
LAURIE DIMAURO, GUN CONTROL: RESTRICTING RIGHTS OR PROTECTING PEOPLE?
INFORMATION PLUS REFERENCE SERIES 2 (2013 ed. 2013).
28
FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21.
19
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governments.29 Many of these state constitutions and declarations of rights
explicitly ensured their people the right to keep and bear arms.30 Beginning
in 1776, one month prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence,
the state of Virginia pronounced in its state constitution, “A well regulated
Militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper,
natural, and safe defence of a free State.”31 Additionally, Pennsylvania’s
Constitution guaranteed, “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the
defence of the State. . . .”32 Recognizing the importance of individuals
bearing arms, other states followed Virginia and drafted similar clauses in
their state constitutions.33 Specifically, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont guaranteed the right to bear arms in
their Bill of Rights.34 However, state constitutions varied from declaring
bearing arms as a “right” of “the people” versus calling it a “duty” of all
able-bodied men to defend society.35 In fact, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont spoke of the right as a guarantee for
“defense of themselves and the State.”36 The emphasis on these states
adopting analogues, prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, provides a
historical narrative that the Federal Second Amendment bestowed an
individual right to keep and to bear arms.37
The next step was the drafting of the Second Amendment to the
Constitution, a document full of compromises and concessions.38 In 1787,
thirty-nine delegates, from twelve of the thirteen states, gathered to sign the
newly written Constitution.39 Initially, the politics of ratification was highly
contested because a majority of Americans and states expressed opposition
to the Constitution.40 In fact, three delegates were reluctant to sign without
a Bill of Rights and in particular, protested that Congress “at their pleasure
may arm or disarm all or any part of the freemen of the United States.”41
29

Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237,
260 (2000).
30
FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21.
31
Id.
32
DIMAURO, supra note 27, at 3.
33
FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21.
34
Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 810 (1998).
35
FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21.
36
Volokh, supra note 34, at 812.
37
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 601–03 (2008).
38
MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN ACTION, THE SECOND AMENDMENT
IN LAW AND HISTORY 48–71, at 51 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000).
39
DIMAURO, supra note 27, at 3.
40
Michael Nelson, Constitutional Beginnings, in GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 45 (Michael
Nelson ed., 4th ed.) [hereinafter Constitutional Beginnings].
41
DIMAURO, supra note 27, at 3.
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After Delaware became the first state to ratify the Constitution in December
1878, Pennsylvania followed five days later, but expressed considerable
doubts at the state’s ratifying convention because of the absence of a Bill of
Rights.42 After similar complaints followed from other states, James
Madison and the Federalists promised to consider amendments to the
Constitution during the First Congress.43 Ultimately, in reliance on the
promise, several states ratified and New Hampshire became the ninth state
to ratify, which meant the United States Constitution was enacted.44 James
Madison, in a remarkable political action at the time, kept his word and
presented the drafted Bill of Rights to the First Congress.45
James Madison’s drafting of the Second Amendment was particularly
influenced by the ratifying state conventions that offered similar
suggestions about the right to bear arms.46 Specifically, calling upon the
states to ratify the Constitution, New York offered fifty amendments and
included the following, “That the People have a right to keep and bear
Arms; that a well regulated Militia, including the body of the People
capable of bearing Arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free
State.” Additionally, Maryland and Virginia consolidated amendments and
emphasized, “That the people have a right to keep and bear arms. . . .”47
With these influences, the Second Amendment assimilated the following
basic values: “[T]he right of the individual to possess arms, the fear of a
professional army, the dependence on militias regulated by the individual
states, and the control of the military by civilians.”48
The inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights was a
result of an ongoing debate over the relationship between military balance
and the newly established system.49 With this debate over the power of
militias and suggestions to reform the structure of the Constitution, several
states proposed provisions to protect the necessary right to bear arms
proscribed in the Second Amendment.50 Ultimately, the First Congress
concluded the debate by declaring the vital importance of the individualright amendments and proposed the Second Amendment.51 The importance
42

Constitutional Beginnings, supra note 40, at 45.
Id.
44
Id. at 46.
45
BELLESILES, supra note 38, at 51.
46
DIMAURO, supra note 27, at 3.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Thiago Luiz Blundi Sturzenegger, The Second Amendment’s Fixed Meaning and Multiple
Purposes, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 337, 384 (2013).
50
Id.
51
Id.
43
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of the Second Amendment in American constitutionalism is irrefutable
proof that the right to bear arms was “the true palladium of liberty.”52
B. HELLER, MCDONALD, AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
An extensive and growing debate has focused on the operative clause
of the Second Amendment. Scholars and courts have entirely overlooked
thorny questions unanswered by the Supreme Court and the Constitution.53
The unambiguous language of the operative clause of the Second
Amendment, which states with unmistakable clarity, “the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”54
The Second Amendment is a quintessential example of unsettled
constitutional law.55 After nearly two centuries of being largely ignored by
the Supreme Court of the United States,56 the Justices addressed the
substantive meaning of the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v.
Heller.57 Although Heller factually dealt with the District of Columbia’s
severe restrictions on the possession of handguns,58 the Court was called to
interpret the meaning of the right to bear arms.59 This case originated when
Heller challenged the District of Columbia’s statute that made it unlawful to
carry unregistered handguns and required lawfully owned firearms to be
kept at home unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger safety
mechanism.60 The precise issue before the Court was whether to interpret
the Second Amendment as affording a private citizen the individual right to
possess a firearm or only affording individuals the right as a member of the
militia or its equivalent.61 In a landmark 5–4 decision, the Court struck
down the District of Columbia’s firearm ban and emphasized, “[t]here
seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second

52
Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings and
Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1123 (2006).
53
Lund, supra note 6, at 1–2.
54
Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 384.
55
But see CARL T. BOGUS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF SECOND AMENDMENT
SCHOLARSHIP: A PRIMER, THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 1 (Carl T. Bogus ed.,
2000).
56
Lund, supra note 6, at 1.
57
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923,
925 (2009).
58
John Sousanis, Second Amendment, in GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 55 (Donna
Batten ed., 3d ed. 2010).
59
Solum, supra note 57, at 925.
60
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–76 (2008).
61
Id. at 577.
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Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”62
The Court’s reasoning focused on a crucial distinction of the textual
components of the amendment63 and noted that “[t]he Second Amendment
is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative
clause.”64 The emphasis of the operative clause is important because “[t]he
first salient feature of the operative clause is that it codifies a ‘right of the
people.’”65 Emphasizing the importance of a historical interpretation of the
text, Justice Scalia, for the court in Heller, indicated that the Court is guided
by the principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary
meaning as distinguished from their technical meaning.”66 Justice Scalia
explained that the historical backdrop clearly substantiates the interpretation
of the operative clause when defining the meaning of the Second
Amendment.67 The Heller decision was a narrow one and did not undertake
an “exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second
Amendment.”68 Specifically, Justice Scalia recognized that earlier Supreme
Court decisions failed to address the specific meaning of the Second
Amendment and emphasized that the Heller ruling stands only to establish
the amendment as a protection of an individual right.
Coming less than two years after Heller,69 the Supreme Court revisited
the Second Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago.70 In McDonald,
five justices ruled the Second Amendment right to bear arms, as interpreted
in Heller, is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and now extends

62

Id.
Kristen L. DeBoise, Constitutional Law––the Second Amendment––D.C. Statute Prohibiting
the Possession of A Useable Handgun in the Home and Restricting Handgun Possession Is
Unconstitutional, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 323, 327 (2009).
64
Heller, 554 U.S. at 575.
65
Id. at 579; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) (writing, “It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect”).
66
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)); see also Solum, supra note 57, at 924 (writing, “the opinions in Heller
represent the most important and extensive debate on the role of original meaning in constitutional
interpretation among the members of the contemporary Supreme Court”).
67
Andrew R. Gould, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within District of Columbia v.
Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1545 (2009).
68
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.2(b) (8th ed. 2010)
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).
69
Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of
the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 352 (2009).
70
Olesya A. Salnikova, “The People” of Heller and Their Politics: Whether Illegal Aliens
Should Have the Right to Bear Arms After United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 625, 642–43 (2013); see generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
63
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to state and local government actions.71 However, four justices ruled that
the amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, while Justice Thomas believed that the Second Amendment
should be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause.72 The plurality’s due process incorporation profoundly
affects the ability to limit the right to bear arms to only citizens.73
Specifically, the incorporative mythology is significant because the Due
Process Clause speaks to “persons,”74 which is broader than the Privileges
or Immunities Clause75 because it includes both citizens and non-citizens
within the United States.76 In fact, the Due Process Clause’s “persons” is
“presumably the broadest formulation of those to whom constitutional
rights inure.”77 However, McDonald “is a fractured opinion”78 and the
decision did not make a difference in the court of appeals’ analysis on alien
gun rights.79 Neither Heller nor McDonald mentioned illegal aliens or nonU.S. citizens, but the Heller decision ultimately had the more significant
impact on how the court of appeals confronted the issue of alien gun
rights.80
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND “THE PEOPLE” OF THE FIRST,
SECOND, AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS
Given the Heller and McDonald decisions, the Second Amendment’s
operative clause still had one significant undefined phrase, “the people.”81
The Court has only once previously attempted to scrutinize the phrase “the
people” and considered it in the context of aliens (illegal or not) within the
Fourth Amendment.82 In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court was
confronted with this uncertain phrase and ultimately resisted to constrict
“the people” to a citizen-only class.83

71

2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 14.2(a) (2016).
Id.
73
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1539.
74
Id.
75
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”) (emphasis added).
76
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 71, at § 14.2(a).
77
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1540.
78
Id.
79
See Salnikova, supra note 70, at 656–57.
80
Id. at 643.
81
Moore, supra note 12, at 842.
82
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012).
83
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1534.
72
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Verdugo-Urquidez is a crucial decision as the Supreme Court’s
holding affected the interpretation of the First and Fourth Amendments and
subsequently, the Second Amendment.84 In this case, Mr. VerdugoUrquidez, a Mexican citizen and resident, was suspected of being a leader
of a violent and large organization that smuggled narcotics into the United
States.85 As a result of the narcotics related activities, local Mexican police
officers arrested Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and transported him to a
California border patrol station.86 Following his arrest, DEA agents
arranged for the searches of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’s Mexican residences.87
Subsequently, American and Mexican authorities searched the homes
without a warrant and obtained incriminating evidence.88 Mr. VerdugoUrquidez moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the warrantless
search was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.89
The question before the Court was whether the Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to
nonresident aliens.90 The Court started its analysis on the text of the Fourth
Amendment and highlighted that the amendment “extends its reach only to
‘the people.’”91 Despite arguments that the framers used the phrase “the
people” to “simply . . . avoid [an] awkward rhetorical redundancy,”92 the
Court correctly emphasized that “the people” is a term of art that is
particularly employed in select parts of the Constitution.93 This deliberate
use of “the people” contrasts with the phrases “persons” and “citizens” used
in other clauses of the Constitution.94 Ultimately, the Court held, “[T]he
text of the Fourth Amendment, its history, and our cases discussing the
application of the Constitution to aliens and extraterritorially require
rejection of [Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’s] claim.”95 However, the Court did

84

The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1081.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990)
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 263.
90
Id. at 261.
91
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
92
Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Southern California, ACLU
of San Diego and Imperial Counties, and Center for Constitutional Rights in Support of Respondent at
12, n.4, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (No. 88-1353), 1989 WL 1127209.
93
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265–66.
94
Id.; see Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1532–33 (writing, “The Constitution uses the words
‘citizens,’ ‘persons,’ and ‘people,’ and does so, presumably, for distinct, although not precisely defined
purposes”); see also Moore, supra note 12, at 807 (writing, “the Bill of Rights makes no mention of
citizens; instead, it focuses on persons (and specific categories of persons) and the people”).
95
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274.
85
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not make this determination solely based on the fact that Mr. VerdugoUrquidez was a nonresident alien.96 Instead, the Court employed a
sufficient connections97 test to make the determination that might place an
illegal alien among “the people” of the United States.98 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the court, concluded:
[The text of the Constitution] suggests that “the people”
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and
Second Amendments . . . refers to a class of persons who
are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community.99
Although the Court did not reach a definitive holding as to who
qualified as part of “the people,”100 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
clearly states that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have
come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with this country.”101 Thus, to determine if illegal aliens are
entitled to constitutional protections, courts must analyze whether the
individual voluntarily entered this country and has accepted some societal
obligations.102
In concurring and dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court Justices
reiterated that illegal aliens should not be categorically barred from the
protections of the Bill of Rights.103 Justice Stevens, writing a concurring
opinion, recognized that aliens, who are lawfully present in the United
States, are entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights because these
individuals are among “the people.”104 Additionally, while dissenting with
the Court’s decision, Justice Brennan wrote, “Fundamental fairness and the
ideals underlying our Bill of Rights compel the conclusion that when we
impose ‘societal obligations,’ . . . we in turn are obliged to respect certain

96

Id.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990) (noting that the court used the
term sufficient connections coextensively with substantial connections).
98
Id. at 273.
99
Id. at 265.
100
Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 8.
101
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
102
Id. at 260; see Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at
14–15 (citing to Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F. 3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying the
Verdugo-Urquidez test)); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2011)
(Dennis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (applying the Verdugo-Urquidez test)).
103
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259–60.
104
Id. at 279.
97
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correlative rights.”105 Justice Brennan’s notion of mutuality is essential to
his point and ultimately concluded, “When we tell the world that we expect
all people . . . to abide by our laws, we cannot in the same breath tell the
world that our law enforcement officers need not do the same . . . we cannot
expect others to respect our laws until we respect our Constitution.”106 The
touchstone of this case was not the question of whether the individual was a
citizen, but the specific inquiry of the extent of one’s connections with the
United States.107
Although Verdugo-Urquidez interpreted “the people” within the
Fourth Amendment, the case is important to understanding the Seventh
Circuit’s decision and the opposing decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Circuits.108 Specifically, emphasized by the Verdugo-Urquidez
Court, the text of the Constitution suggests that the phrase “the people”
used in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments should carry the same
meaning because of the similarity of the worded amendments.109 The
Supreme Court declared that it is widely understood that the First, Second
and Fourth Amendments codify a pre-existing right of “the people.”110
Ratified at the same time, each of these amendments contains the phrase
“the people” within its text.111 Specifically, each of the amendments
provides as follows: First Amendment: “[c]ongress shall make no law . . .
abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances;”112 Second Amendment: “[t]he
right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed;”113 Fourth
Amendment: “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . .”114 Realizing the textual analysis of “the people” is the same

105

Id. at 284.
Id. at 297 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107
The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1078.
108
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536.
109
Matthew Blair, Constitutional Cheap Shots: Targeting Undocumented Residents with the
Second Amendment, 9 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 159, 177 (2012).
110
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (noting that the First, Second, and
Fourth Amendments protects rights that predated the Bill of Rights).
111
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United States
v. Emerson, 270 F. 3d 203, 227–28 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting, “‘[T]he people’ have precisely the same
meaning within the Second Amendment as without. And, as used throughout the Constitution.”); Florida
Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 39 (2008) (emphasizing that “identical
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”).
112
Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 9 (quoting the
U.S. CONST. amend. I).
113
Id. (quoting the U.S. CONST. amend. II).
114
Id. (quoting the U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
106
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throughout each of the amendments, the Heller Court could not have
possibly intended to reinterpret the meaning of “the people” and remove
non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens from the protections of the Bill of
Rights.115 This interpretation would result in far-reaching constitutional
implications of already established constitutional rights that are afforded to
this class of individuals.
The Verdugo-Urquidez decision justifies why the Heller Court’s
holding should only be regarded as deciding the individual right versus the
collective right question.116 First, Justice Scalia, the author of the Heller
decision, joined the majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez and must have
been clearly aware that the interpretation of “the people” had left open the
possibility that the Second Amendment would extend beyond the
citizenry.117 This justifies the main argument of this Comment, the Heller
Court did not definitively attempt to clarify the rightsholders of the Second
Amendment. Second, Justice Scalia’s numerous references to citizens and
law-abiding members in Heller must not be held to formulate a new
interpretation of “the people.”118 In fact, this new formulation would
explicitly contradict Verdugo-Urquidez, the same decision the Heller Court
cites to in its decision.119 Specifically, in citing to Verdugo-Urquidez, the
Heller Court adopted that “[‘the people’ is] a term of art employed in select
parts of the Constitution . . . [and its uses] suggest that ‘the people’
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second
Amendments” refers to a class of persons who have developed sufficient
connections with this country.120 Justice Scalia’s formulation of “the
people” in Heller clearly contradicts Verdugo-Urquidez, but also
purportedly affirms its definition and the sufficient connections test.121
Ultimately, courts must recognize that the phrase “the people” is a concept
explicitly found in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, with the
framers deliberately employing the limiting terminology of “citizen” in
other distinct parts of the Constitution.122

115

Blair, supra note 109, at 176.
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (quoting United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)).
121
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536.
122
Id. at 1536–37.
116
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Supreme Court has consistently found that non-U.S. citizens and
illegal aliens are entitled to constitutional rights.123 Although the Seventh
Circuit’s decision is contrary to four other circuits, the decision is
constitutionally correct as non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens are part of
“the people” under the Second Amendment.124 The decisions opposed to
the Seventh Circuit are based on flawed reasoning. Specifically, the courts
misconstrued the meaning of “the people” by misinterpreting Supreme
Court precedent, the Bill of Rights, and historical traditions.
With a constitutional right at stake in their decisions, the Fourth, Fifth,
and Eighth Circuits incorrectly interpreted that illegal aliens are not part of
“the people” and thus, not afforded the protections of the Second
Amendment. Specifically, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits expanded
the scope of Heller by focusing on Justice Scalia’s amorphous nouns and
dicta used when discussing the people’s individual right to bear arms.125
Justice Scalia makes references in Heller to “all members of the political
community,” “all Americans,” “citizens,” “Americans,” and “law-abiding
citizens;” however, the opinion is incorrectly interpreted to suggest that
Justice Scalia was reformulating and defining “the people” protected by the
Second Amendment.126 In fact, the Heller decision did not purport to
define the term “the people;” instead, the Court focused on one specific
question: whether the right to bear arms is an individual right to selfdefense or a collective right connected with the militia or its equivalent.127
Specifically, Justice Scalia emphasized that Heller was the first “in-depth
123
See Brief of Appellant at 6, United States v. Flores, 663 F. 3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 111550), 2011 WL 2310104 (noting these precedent decisions and holdings, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
211–12 (1982) (the Equal Protection Clause extends to undocumented aliens) [hereinafter Brief of
Appellant]; Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (the Fifth Amendment “person”
extends to resident aliens); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (First Amendment extends
protection to resident aliens); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections extend to resident aliens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1896) (the
Fourteenth Amendment “persons” extends to resident aliens)).
124
See generally United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 664 (7th Cir. 2015).
125
Heller, 554 U.S. at 645 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Heller Court overlooked the
significance of how the Framers use “the phrase” in different contexts within constitutional provisions).
126
See id. at 625 (Scalia, J., for the Court); see also Blair, supra note 109, at 168 (noting that
Justice Scalia’s opinions “reveal a pattern of similar rhetoric, in which ‘citizen’ does not denote anything
other than a simple inhabitant of the United States”).
127
See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F. 3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that
“Heller does not purport to define the full scope of the Second Amendment.”); The Meaning(s) of “The
People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1087 (noting that the Heller Court expressly declined to
address many Second Amendment uncertainties and the decision should not be identified as purporting
to clarify the entire field).
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examination of the Second Amendment” and therefore, “one should not
expect it to clarify the entire field.”128
At the heart of these Second Amendment cases129 is an issue that is
broader than the mere possession of a firearm.130 The issue is whether
illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens are afforded the right to bear arms and
the right to defend themselves in their homes.131 Ultimately, Supreme
Court precedent and historical traditions established that the Second
Amendment is a pre-existing right that is extended to all people, including
illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens, who have established substantial
connections with the community and accepted some societal obligations.132
A. UNITED STATES V. PORTILLO-MUNOZ - (5TH CIR. 2011)
The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit to address the question of
whether unauthorized aliens are considered part of “the people” under the
Second Amendment.133 On July 10, 2010, Mr. Armando Portillo-Munoz, a
Mexican native, who resided in the United States for one-year and six
months, was arrested for possessing a .22 caliber handgun in Texas.134 On
the day of the arrest, Mr. Portillo-Munoz was working on a dairy farm when
police responded to a call regarding an individual “spinning around” on a
motorcycle with a gun in their waistband.135 As police approached, Mr.
Portillo-Munoz acknowledged using the firearm to protect the ranch’s
chickens from coyotes and admitted to being illegally present in the United
States.136 Subsequently, Mr. Portillo-Munoz was indicted and convicted of
possessing a firearm.137 Prior to this indictment, there were no reports that
Mr. Portillo-Munoz had a prior criminal history, arrests, or encounters with
immigration officials and law enforcement.138
Mr. Portillo-Munoz challenged his conviction by arguing that the
statute violated the United States Constitution because he was afforded the
128

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
Each of the defendants in these Second Amendment cases were indicted under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(5)(A), which made it unlawful for unauthorized aliens to possess firearms or ammunition.
130
Defendant-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1, United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664
(7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3271), 2015 WL 3383302.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011).
134
Id. at 438.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d at 438.
129
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right to bear arms under the Second Amendment.139 Relying on the
decision in Heller, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction by emphasizing
that the “language in Heller invalidates Portillo’s attempt to extend the
protections of the Second Amendment to illegal aliens.”140 The court
focused its analysis on Justice Scalia’s numerous references in Heller of
“law-abiding, responsible citizens” and “members of a political
community” and concluded that “aliens who enter or remain in this country
illegally and without authorization are not Americans as that word is
commonly understood.”141 Despite the Heller Court specifically stating that
its decision was not purporting to “clarify the entire field,”142 the Fifth
Circuit held that Heller, in fact, did formulate the meaning of “the people”
within the Second Amendment.143
In contrast, Mr. Portillo-Munoz argued, relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez, that he had established sufficient
connections with the United States to be considered part of “the people”
under the Second Amendment.144 Addressing Mr. Portillo-Munoz’s
argument, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Supreme Court precedent
has emphasized that the same analysis should be applied and followed to
define the meaning of “the people” in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, to the Second Amendment.145 However, the Fifth Circuit,
incorrectly and misguidedly, failed to analogize the Second and Fourth
Amendment and concluded, “[W]e do not find that the use of ‘the people’
in both the Second and the Fourth Amendment mandates a holding that the
two amendments cover exactly the same groups of people.”146 The court
relied on the fact that the purposes of the Second and Fourth Amendment
are different as the “Second Amendment grants an affirmative right to keep
and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a protective right
against abuses by the government.”147 Based on a broad reading of the
Heller decision, as well as the perceived distinction of the Second and
Fourth Amendments,148 the Fifth Circuit refused to apply Supreme Court
precedent and held that “the phrase ‘the people’ in the Second Amendment
139
Appellant’s Initial Brief at 10, United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011)
(No. 11-10086), 2011 WL 2115675.
140
United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011).
141
Id.
142
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
143
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d at 440.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011)
147
Id. at 441.
148
Blair, supra note 109, at 175–76.
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of the Constitution does not include aliens illegally in the United States.”149
Disagreeing with the majority’s dismissal of Mr. Portillo-Munoz’s
Second Amendment claim, Circuit Judge Dennis realized that the Fifth
Circuit’s decision would have far-reaching constitutional consequences for
illegal aliens.150 Specifically, the dissent emphasized that “[t]he majority’s
reasoning renders [illegal aliens] vulnerable—to governmental intrusions on
their homes and persons, as well as interference with their rights to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances—with no
recourse.”151 One of the most powerful arguments for the dissent is the fact
that the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion is incongruous and wholly
unsupported by the Supreme Court’s and Fifth Circuit’s precedent, which
may lead to the elimination of already established constitutional protections
afforded to illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens.152
B. UNITED STATES V. FLORES - (8TH CIR. 2011)
The next court to address this Second Amendment question was the
Eighth Circuit. On May 13, 2010, Joaquin Flores was arrested after an
executed search warrant discovered a .22 caliber Intertech model, Tek 22.153
Mr. Flores resided in the United States since his teenage years, was
involved in a relationship with an American citizen, and had two U.S.
citizen children.154 While Mr. Flores had been deported on numerous
occasions, he maintained a home in Minnesota, held close ties with his
immediate family in the United States, and earned gainful employment for
the benefit of his family.155 The Eighth Circuit dismissed the case without
independently addressing Mr. Flores’ Second Amendment claim.156 The

149

Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d at 442.
Id. at 448 (Dennis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
151
Id. at 444–45.
152
United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2011); see District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265
(1990)) (specifically explaining that “‘the people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select
parts of the Constitution,” and that the phrase refers to those who are “protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments”); see also Emerson, 270 F. 3d at 227–28
(writing, “There is no evidence in the text of the Second Amendment, or any other part of the
Constitution, that the words ‘the people’ have a different connotation within the Second Amendment
than when employed elsewhere in the Constitution. In fact, the text of the Constitution, as a whole,
strongly suggests that the words ‘the people’ have precisely the same meaning within the Second
Amendment as without.”).
153
Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 1.
154
Id. at 8.
155
Id. at 8–9.
156
United States v. Flores, 663 F. 3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011).
150
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court’s holding and reasoning cannot be discussed in detail as the court
failed to address the merits of Mr. Flores’ Second Amendment claim.
Specifically, in a per curiam decision, the court simply “[a]gree[d] with the
Fifth Circuit that the protections of the Second Amendment do not extend
to aliens illegally present in this country.”157 The merits of Mr. Flores’
claim warranted detailed consideration rather than a misguided reliance on
unpersuasive authority and an erroneous, “agreeing with the Fifth
Circuit.”158
Mr. Flores’ argument relied heavily on the Verdugo-Urquidez
substantial connection test and also presented a number of Supreme Court
cases that established constitutional protections for illegal aliens. Asking
the court to recognize his right to possess firearms under the Second
Amendment, Mr. Flores petitioned that “[the United States] is where the
most important people in his life live, this is where he had a home, [and]
this is where he had a job and employers and friends.”159 Further, Mr.
Flores reiterated his connection with the United States by pleading about his
involved relationship with a U.S. citizen and their two U.S. citizen
children.160 With this substantial connection with the United States, Mr.
Flores stressed the importance of the Eighth Circuit to follow the holding in
Verdugo-Urquidez and find that “[h]e is a member of ‘the people’ as that
term is used in the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”161 Instead of addressing Mr. Flores’ merits and his
relationship with the country, the Eighth Circuit confined its analysis by
relying on Portillo-Munoz and affirmed the decision on the grounds that the
Second Amendment does not extend to illegal aliens present in the United
States.162
C. UNITED STATES V. HUITRON-GUIZAR - (10TH CIR. 2012)
Nearly one-year after the Fifth and Eighth Circuit’s decisions, the
Tenth Circuit was faced with the same vexing Second Amendment
challenge.163 However, the Tenth Circuit sidestepped the constitutional
question of the Second Amendment164 and reached the same conclusion by

157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2011).
Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
United States v. Flores, 663 F. 3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1169.
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undergoing an intermediate scrutiny analysis.165 In March 2011, officers
executed a search warrant at Mr. Huitron-Guizar’s family’s home and
recovered three firearms.166 Mr. Huitron-Guizar’s was a twenty-four yearold Mexican citizen, who had resided in the United States for years.167
Subsequently, Mr. Huitron-Guizar was indicted for being an illegal alien in
possession of a firearm and entered a guilty plea.168 The long-lasting effect
of this conviction was that Mr. Huitron-Guizar was to be transported to an
immigration official for deportation.169
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction of Mr. HuitronGuizar by dancing around the Second Amendment challenge of the
appellant.170 However, refraining from expanding the scope of Heller, the
Tenth Circuit correctly emphasized that “aliens were not part of the
calculus” of the Heller decision.171 Specifically, the court noted that neither
the Heller majority nor dissenters mention the phrases “aliens,”
“immigrants,” or “non-citizens.”172 The court further refused to read into
Heller an all-encompassing interpretation of the Second Amendment
because “[this] question seems large and complicated.”173
The Tenth Circuit’s decision properly recognized that Heller did not
purport to clearly define the full scope of the Second Amendment.174
Despite the Fifth Circuit’s broad interpretation of Heller, the Tenth Circuit
outright refuted the interpretation175 and hesitated to infer a rule from Heller
that categorically prohibited non-citizens and illegal aliens from the right to
bear arms.176 Specifically, the court noted that the use of the term “citizen”
by the Heller majority was not deliberate because it would directly conflict
with Verdugo-Urquidez, a case the Heller majority relied on.177 The court
emphasized that relying on the use of “citizen” in Heller “would require
[this court] to hold that the same ‘people’ who receive Fourth Amendment
protections are denied Second Amendment protections, even though both
rights seem at root concerned with guarding the sanctity of the home

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Blair, supra note 109, at 164.
Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rostron, supra note 11, at 827.
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1168.
Blair, supra note 109, at 164.
Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1168.
Id.
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against invasion.”178
Instead of reaching a conclusion on the Second Amendment challenge,
the court upheld Mr. Huitron-Guizar’s conviction by applying intermediate
scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) and concluded that “courts must defer
to Congress as it lawfully exercises its constitutional power . . . to ensure
safety and order.”179 Although the Tenth Circuit avoided the constitutional
question of the Second Amendment, the court’s opinion provided valuable
insight on how to interpret the amendment.180 Specifically, the court
emphasized the need to follow a historical approach; however, in the
present case, neither party addressed this textual-history inquiry of gun
ownership and citizenship and thus, the court “abstain[ed] on [the] question
[with] such far-reaching dimensions without [the] full record and
adversarial argument.”181
D. UNITED STATES V. CARPIO-LEON - (4TH CIR. 2012)
The Fourth Circuit was the last circuit to wrongfully deny a class of
individuals Second Amendment protections. On February 24, 2011,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested Nicolas Carpio-Leon, a
citizen of Mexico, for possessing a .22 caliber Marlin rifle, a 9 mm Hi–
Point model C pistol, and ammunition following a consensual search.182 Up
until the date of the arrest, Mr. Carpio-Leon had lived in the United States
for thirteen years with his three children, each of whom were born in the
United States, and had no prior criminal record.183 Subsequently, Mr.
Carpio-Leon moved to dismiss the indictment as a violation of his Second
Amendment right to bear arms.184 The district court denied his motion,
finding that “[Heller] and other Supreme Court precedent foreclose[d] [his]
argument that aliens illegally present in the United States are among those
protected by the Second Amendment.”185
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected Mr. Carpio-Leon’s Second
Amendment challenge and held that the amendment does not afford
protections to illegal aliens.186 Relying on the Heller decision and

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974, 975 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 975.
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undergoing a historical analysis, the court reasoned that “illegal aliens do
not fall in the class of persons who are classified as law-abiding members of
the political community for the purpose of defining the Second
Amendment’s scope.”187 The court improperly relied on the term “lawabiding, responsible citizens”188 because Justice Scalia’s amorphous
references were not intended to redefine the scope of “the people” within
the Second Amendment. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit went on to
question how an unauthorized alien is law-abiding by characterizing their
particular relationship to the United States.189 Specifically, the court
asserted, “[T]he crime of illegal entry inherently carries this additional
aspect that leaves an illegal alien’s status substantially unprotected by the
Constitution in many respects.”190 The distinct analysis of this court is
incorrect as it completely misconstrued and broadened the holding of
Heller.
In contrast, Mr. Carpio-Leon disputed the government’s historical
analysis of the Second Amendment and argued that the “Second
Amendment could not have been intended to exclude illegal aliens from its
scope.”191 Mr. Carpio-Leon reasoned that “‘[historical] attitudes toward
immigration were the reverse of today’s attitudes’ and that ‘[c]onsidering
the country’s need for immigrants to settle frontier areas[,] . . . denying
immigrants the right to defend themselves and their families would have
been unthinkable.’”192 Although the Fourth Circuit accurately noted that
the Supreme Court was not clear on whether “the people” extended to
illegal aliens, the court dismissed Mr. Carpio-Leon’s historical claim
because it “does not controvert the historical evidence supporting the notion
that the government could disarm individuals who are not law-abiding
members of the political community.”193
The Fourth Circuit
overemphasized the historical discussion in Heller and misguidedly stressed
that the Second Amendment exclusively and unequivocally protects lawabiding members of the political community.194 The court then recited,
“most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms
was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the

187
Id. at 981; see also The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at
1099 (emphasizing “that courts should not adopt [a] strong reading of Heller”).
188
United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 2012);
189
Id. at 981.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 976.
192
Id. at 980–81.
193
Id. at 980.
194
United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 2012).
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government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”195
Furthermore, the court relied heavily on the significance of the illegal
status of Mr. Carpio-Leon.196 Specifically, the court emphasized Mr.
Carpio-Leon’s particular relationship as an illegal alien with the United
States197 and limited its analysis to a wrongful application of Heller.198
Judge Niemeyer, writing for the court, stressed:
[W]e need not limit our analysis to the scope of the term
“the people” and thereby become enmeshed in the question
of whether “the people” includes illegal aliens or whether
the term has the same scope in each of its constitutional
uses. This is because Heller concludes, through a distinct
analysis, that the core right historically protected by the
Second Amendment is the right of self-defense by “lawabiding, responsible citizens” . . . [to which is a class that]
illegal aliens do not belong.199
E. UNITED STATES V. MEZA-RODRIGUEZ - (7TH CIR. 2015)
The Seventh Circuit was the most recent Circuit Court of Appeals to
be confronted with the question of defining “the people” within the Second
Amendment.200 Mariano Meza-Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen, was brought
to the United States when he was four or five years old and has remained in
the country since that time.201 In August 2013, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s
trouble began when a bar fight broke out and witnesses identified him as an
individual carrying a firearm.202 Subsequently, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was
arrested and convicted for carrying a .22 Caliber cartridge.203 Although Mr.
Meza-Rodriguez was arrested for the possession of a firearm cartridge, the
issue before the Seventh Circuit was what he did not possess—
documentation showing that he was lawfully in the United States.204 At the
trial court, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the conviction and
asserted that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on his Second

195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Id. at 979–980 (quoting United States v. Vongxay, 594 F. 3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 981.
Id.
Anjali Motgi, Of Arms and Aliens, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 2 (2013).
Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d at 978–79.
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Amendment right to bear arms.205
Although upholding Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s conviction, the Seventh
Circuit held that unauthorized non-citizens have the constitutional right to
invoke the Second Amendment.206 The court properly recognized that the
identical phrasing of “the people” throughout the Bill of Rights must carry
the same meaning because the amendments were adopted as a package.207
Reluctant to put more weight on the Heller decision, the court identified
that neither Heller nor any other Supreme Court decision has addressed
whether non-U.S. citizens or illegal aliens are part of “the people” under the
Second Amendment.208 Specifically, the court noted that Heller’s rhetoric
of referencing “law-abiding members” and “members of the political
community” did not reflect the Court defining the meaning of “the
people.”209 However, the Seventh Circuit relied on the opinion in Heller in
certain regards when it noted the “similarities between the Second
Amendment and the First and Fourth Amendments, [which] impl[ies] that
the phrase ‘the people’ (which occurs in all three) has the same meaning in
all three provisions.”210
After recognizing that “the people” in the First, Second, and Fourth
Amendments carried the same meaning throughout, the court turned its
focus on defining the phrase “the people.”211 The Seventh Circuit employed
the Verdugo-Urquidez’s substantial connection test.212 Relying on the
recognition that “the people” should be defined consistently, the Seventh
Circuit emphasized that the Second Amendment analysis must apply the
same substantial connection analysis, as applied to the Fourth Amendment,
to determine if unauthorized aliens and non-U.S. citizens are part of “the
people.”213
In contrast, the government’s argument countered the substantial
connections test by focusing on Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s immigration status
and “unsavory traits.”214 First, the government argued that unauthorized
non-U.S. citizens cannot accept the basic obligations of society because
these individuals are illegal under the law.215 Second, the government
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id.
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 670.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 670.
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 671.
Id.
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questioned Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s moral character by introducing his
multiple interactions with law enforcement to allude that Mr. MezaRodriguez has not accepted the basic obligations of living in American
society.216 Ultimately, the court rejected the government’s argument and
emphasized that this factual inquiry of the individual would cause a caseby-case analysis that would be difficult to implement.217 Specifically, the
case-by-case analysis would subject non-citizens to the potential of losing
previously held constitutional rights simply because the non-citizen or
illegal immigrant began to behave in a criminal or immoral way.218 The
court emphasized that the Second Amendment is “not limited to such onagain, off-again protection.”219 Instead, the court declared that “the only
question is whether the alien has developed substantial connections as a
resident in this country.”220
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit then addressed the question of
whether unauthorized aliens are to be considered part of “the people” for
constitutional purposes.221 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the
Seventh Circuit noted that “Plyler shows that even unauthorized aliens
enjoy certain constitutional rights, and so unauthorized status (reflected in
the lack of documentation) cannot support a per se exclusion from ‘the
people’ protected by the Bill of Rights.”222 In fact, Supreme Court
precedent has long recognized that unauthorized aliens and non-citizens are
protected under the Bill of Rights when they have developed substantial
connections with this country.223
Although Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s behavior was not commendable, the
Seventh Circuit held that he was entitled to the protections of the Second
Amendment.224 Chief Judge Wood, writing for the court, concluded:
In the post-Heller world, where it is now clear that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms is no second-class
entitlement, we see no principled way to carve out the

216

Id.
Id.
218
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2015).
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 672; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (writing, “Whatever his status under the
immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens
whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due
process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
223
Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 671 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 260 (1990)).
224
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015).
217
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Second Amendment and say that the unauthorized (or
maybe all noncitizens) are excluded. No language in the
Amendment supports such a conclusion, nor, as we have
said, does a broader consideration of the Bill of Rights.225
Again, this case is bigger than the cartridge that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez
possessed.226 This case is about the Seventh Circuit accurately interpreting
Supreme Court precedent227 and holding that the Second Amendment
protects unauthorized aliens and non-U.S. citizens.228 After the court held
that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez could invoke the protections of the Second
Amendment, the court then analyzed whether the statute was a permissible
restriction on the right to bear arms.229
IV. THE IMPACT AND ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
DECISIONS
With little guidance from the Supreme Court defining “the people” in
the Second Amendment,230 this Comment supports the approach utilized by
the Seventh Circuit in the Meza-Rodriguez decision. There are countless
individuals who work for their families, accept societal obligations, and
maintain ties in the United States, but are not entitled to the constitutional
protections of the Second Amendment because of their illegal status or not
attaining U.S. citizenship. Making a determination based on the reasoning
that simply because individuals are not citizens, they are not part of “the
people” is an unwarranted intrusion on constitutional rights with farreaching implications. Specifically, the constitutional implications will
render these individuals vulnerable to government violations of the Bill of
Rights with no recourse.231 Dating back to this nation’s founding and
continuing today, courts have struggled to clearly define the constitutional

225

Id.
Defendant-Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 130, at 14.
227
Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 664.
228
Id. at 671; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose presence in
[the United States] is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to . . . protection” under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, from deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.).
229
Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 672.
230
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasizing, “The
only Supreme Court case to scrutinize the phrase [the people] is United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez”).
231
See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that unauthorized aliens are
not part of the people “renders them vulnerable—to governmental intrusions on their homes and
persons, as well as interference with their rights to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances—with no recourse”).
226
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rights and protections associated with illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens.232
Instead of foreclosing constitutional rights solely based on a status, courts
must undergo an in-depth analysis of the specific text of the United States
Constitution and the precedents set forth by the Supreme Court.
The Second Amendment has been the source of a never-ending debate
that has added uncertainty and tension to the amendment’s interpretation
and meaning.233 The right to bear arms is not an unlimited right234 and
courts are reluctant to grant this right to non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens
because of unspecified fear and prejudice. In fact, the contrary circuits have
held that individuals, who have lived here peacefully, though
undocumented and illegal, are constitutionally prohibited from the
protections of the right to keep and bear arms.235 The right to protect
oneself and home is a fundamental right deeply rooted in historical
traditions and courts are subjecting non-U.S. Citizens and illegal aliens to
the vulnerabilities of non-protection. The opposing circuits’ reluctance to
recognize these individuals’ constitutional right is unsound and unsupported
because each circuit relies on overly broad interpretations of dicta in Heller
and refuses to recognize that Verdugo-Urquidez is still controlling
precedent. Specifically, the reasoning of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Circuits is flawed because each court relies on a proposition that the Heller
Court did not definitively attempt to clarify or define. Certain policy
decisions may warrant prohibitions against these individuals to possess
firearms, but these policy choices must not supplant the constitutional right
of these individuals to keep and bear arms.
The Fifth Circuit was the first court to wrongly decide that illegal
aliens are not considered part of “the people” under the Second
Amendment.236 This decision was flawed because it focused on an
expanded interpretation of the Heller decision. Specifically, the Fifth
Circuit incorrectly concentrated on Justice Scalia’s numerous references of
the different classes of individuals to imply that Heller narrowed the
definition of “the people.” In fact, it is well noted that Heller was primarily
concerned with the question of deciding whether the Second Amendment is
an individual right or a collective right, not the precise identity of “the

232

Moore, supra note 12, at 803; see also The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution,
supra note 2, at 1099 (concluding, “it may be possible to view Heller as a commentary on the meaning
of ‘the people’ in the First and Fourth Amendments, this interpretation is at odds with the Court’s
precedents, the Constitution’s purposes, and this country’s principles”).
233
Salnikova, supra note 70, at 637.
234
See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008).
235
Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 29.
236
See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d at 439.
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people.”237 Based on this reasoning, the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion
overreaches because it is not supported or founded in the holding of
Heller.238 The Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Justice Scalia’s amorphous nouns
affords too much weight to these inadvertent references239 and thus, leads to
a misguided interpretation of the meaning of “the people” in the Second
Amendment. This unsupported position taken by the Fifth Circuit is
misguided because it leads to a narrow interpretation that the Second
Amendment proffers a citizen only right.240 Implying that “the people”
equates to “citizen” within the Second Amendment ultimately implies that
the Bill of Rights is a citizen only entitlement, which is contrary to already
established Supreme Court precedent.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation is misguided because
the Supreme Court has widely recognized the different terms of art
employed in the Constitution. Indeed, if the drafters intended to proffer the
Bill of Rights as a citizen only right, then why not specifically use “citizen,”
which is explicitly employed in other distinct parts of the United States
Constitution? What was most surprising of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of
Heller was its acknowledgment that the Heller decision did not purport “to
clarify the entire field” of the Second Amendment,241 but then expanded the
reading of Justice Scalia’s noun usage to define and clarify unresolved
issues. This analysis and proposition is counterintuitive and ultimately
leads to an overreaching holding with neither supporting precedent nor
historical foundation.
Another flaw of the Fifth Circuit’s decision was its analysis of
distinguishing the Second and Fourth Amendment by emphasizing that the
interpretation of “the people” within each amendment should not be
identical.242 The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has held that
the meaning of “the people” in the Fourth Amendment should be
interpreted in the same context as the Second Amendment; however, the
Fifth Circuit deviated from this precedent and created an alternative
analysis by focusing between the difference of a protected right (Fourth
Amendment) and an affirmative right (Second Amendment).243 This is the
most contradictory part of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis as the same decision

237

The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1085.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008).
239
Id.
240
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1571.
241
See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011).
242
See id. at 441.
243
See Blair, supra note 109, at 185 (writing that this affirmative versus passive right test finds
little support in precedent and is unlikely to be followed by other courts addressing this rule).
238
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it has relied on throughout its opinion, Heller, quotes Verdugo-Urquidez’s
unambiguous language that “the people” protected by the Fourth
Amendment, are also protected by the First and Second Amendment.244
This selective choice of dicta and precedent leads to a flawed analysis and
decision. Specifically, it is clear that the Heller Court’s citing to VerdugoUrquidez strongly indicates that the Court supports and adopts this
interpretation of “the people.”245 However, the Fifth Circuit failed to
recognize this aspect of Heller and ultimately, deprived illegal aliens and
non-U.S. citizens of the protections of the Second Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit was a divided court and the dissent clearly rejected
the majority’s dismissal of the Second Amendment claim.246 The dissent
supported the viewpoint of this Comment, that the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of “the people” in Verdugo-Urquidez is the correct analysis to
be applied to the Second Amendment.247 Although the Supreme Court has
not resolved this prevailing issue, the Fifth Circuit’s decision overreached
and misguidedly expanded the Heller decision through its refusal to
recognize the clear criteria settled in Verdugo-Urquidez—still controlling
precedent.248 The court’s failure to recognize the Verdugo-Urquidez
interpretation of “the people” creates a lingering threat to other
constitutional rights proffered to this class of individuals.249 This picking
and choosing of rights afforded to citizens is based on arbitrary analysis that
will ultimately strip away protections already afforded to non-U.S. Citizens
and illegal aliens.250 In fact, the Fifth Circuit’s lack of textual support,251
other than inadvertent nouns used by Justice Scalia in Heller,252 supports
the conclusion that the Second Amendment protections extend beyond the
citizenry.
The Eighth Circuit was the next circuit to address the interpretation of
“the people” and did little to clarify the analysis and interpretation set forth
244

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008).
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536.
246
United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
247
Id.
248
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1990).
249 Constitutional Law––Second Amendment––Fifth Circuit Holds That Undocumented
Immigrants Do Not Have Second Amendment Rights.––United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437
(5th Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 835, 836 (2012) (writing, “it was unfortunate because the [PortilloMunoz] [C]ourt implied that undocumented immigrants may not have Fourth Amendment rights when,
in fact, that matter remains unresolved. Such dicta can have important consequences”) [hereinafter Fifth
Circuit Holds That Undocumented Immigrants Do Not Have Second Amendment Rights].
250
Blair, supra note 109, at 185.
251
Id. at 168.
252
The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1089.
245
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in the Fifth Circuit’s decision.253 The court’s per curiam decision, which
simply affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit, was in part due to the
minimal persuasive authority of Mr. Flores’ brief. Although Mr. Flores’
brief utilized the substantial connection test, the brief did little to exploit the
Fifth Circuit’s irrational approach of expanding the scope of the Heller
decision. The correct approach to challenging an incorrect interpretation of
“the people” is to justify the use of the substantial connection test by
emphasizing that Supreme Court precedent supports this position and
Verdugo-Urquidez is still controlling authority. This is accomplished by
differentiating the specific question addressed in Heller and the Second
Amendment question addressed in these cases. This is where the appellant
failed, which ultimately led to the Eighth Circuit’s per curiam decision.
However, one portion of Flores’ brief warranted the court’s consideration.
Specifically, Mr. Flores’ reiterated that it has been widely held that nonU.S. citizens and illegal aliens have been afforded and are entitled to the
protections of the Constitution.254 The fact that these individuals must
oblige to our legal system follows that they ought to be entitled to the
extensions of the United States Constitution.255 In fact, James Madison
supported this position and declared,
[I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the
Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that whilst they
actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection.
Aliens are not more parties to the laws, than they are parties
to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed, that as they
owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled,
in return, to their protection and advantage.256
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit’s decision was misguided because it
relied on the flawed decision of the Fifth Circuit. However, not to discredit
the court, Mr. Flores’ brief provided unpersuasive support for his Second
Amendment claim and did little to challenge the preceding opinion of the
Fifth Circuit.257 Strong and persuasive arguments emphasize that the Heller
Court’s use of the word “citizen” and “law-abiding members” did not
intentionally proscribe a constitutional test for the identity of “the people”

253

See United States v. Flores, 663 F. 3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011).
See generally supra note 123 (noting Supreme Court cases discussing constitutional
protections extended to illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens).
255
David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?,
25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 371 (2003).
256
Id.
257
See Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 4–10.
254
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under the Second Amendment.258 The slicing and dicing of the Heller
opinion is not the proper analysis to impose a restriction on the
constitutional rights of non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens.
The Tenth Circuit was another court to uphold the Second Amendment
ban on illegal alien’s possession of firearms. The court did not specifically
decide “the people” question of this Comment, but offered correct insight
on how to interpret the Heller decision and the Second Amendment.259 The
Tenth Circuit’s main proposition was that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits read
too far in-depth into an unwritten holding of the Heller Court.260 This is the
precise point as of why the analysis is flawed in the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Circuits. The Tenth Circuit addressed why Justice Scalia’s
numerous references should not be taken to scrutinize “the people.”
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Heller Court also referred to
the First Amendment and citizens,261 which we surely can conclude that
Justice Scalia did not establish that the First Amendment requires U.S.
citizenship to speak for any purpose.262 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’
creative reading of Heller incorrectly leads to a narrower interpretation of
“the people” and essentially overrules the foundational reading of the
phrase established by the Supreme Court.263 Specifically, the VerdugoUrquidez decision laid the foundation that “people” is a term of broader
content than “citizen.”264
Courts must recognize that the Heller decision left an open door on
other Second Amendment questions and must not partake in a slicing and
dicing of the Heller opinion to introduce broader holdings with
constitutional implications. The Heller Court answered a narrow question
of the individual right afforded under the Second Amendment; therefore,
Justice Scalia’s noun references cannot be held as a deliberate attempt to
settle the difficult question of defining “the people.”265 The Court has
258
Blair, supra note 109, at 169 (writing, “[p]atriotically spirited as the word ‘citizen’ may be, it
should not be read literally as a constitutional test”).
259
See United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012).
260
Id.
261
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (Scalia, J., opined “we do not
read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation,
just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose”)
(emphasis in original).
262
Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1168–69 (emphasizing, “Heller also spoke of the First
Amendment rights of ‘citizens,’ though we know that that amendment extends in some degree to
resident aliens, too”); see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1945) (ruling that the First
Amendment extends to resident aliens in some degree).
263
Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 17.
264
Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1168.
265
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 2012).
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explicitly cautioned against expansive reading of statements of decisions
that address issues not before the Court.266 Specifically, the Court declared,
“[our] job [is] to decide particular legal issues while assuming without
deciding the validity of antecedent propositions . . . and such assumptions . .
. are not binding in future cases that directly raise the questions.”267
Although upholding the Second Amendment ban on other grounds, the
Tenth Circuit correctly recognized that courts should not read into Heller an
unwritten holding; therefore, the Court did not declare a citizenry only test
for the protections of the Second Amendment.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the question and observed
the decisions of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.268 After undergoing a
“distinct analysis” of Heller, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the numerous
nouns of Justice Scalia’s opinion to declare that the Second Amendment
requires a law-abiding, citizenry test to determine who is afforded the
protections of the amendment.269 This approach of expanding the Heller
decision is constitutionally incorrect and the various references to “citizens”
and “law-abiding members” should not be taken as a literal interpretation of
“the people.” However, the Fourth Circuit introduced another aspect to this
debate by highlighting the title undocumented individuals hold as
“illegal.”270 The Fourth Circuit emphasized the title to reflect a historical
approach that limits Second Amendment rights to individuals who are lawabiding members of the community.271 The Fourth Circuit cites persuasive
authority for its position that this right correlates with law-abiding
individuals, but it fails to persuasively distinguish a law-abiding individual
to someone who could be law-abiding, but merely entered the country
illegally.272 Specifically, an individual can be a law-abiding, undocumented
member of this country; however, the Fourth Circuit’s test of law-abiding is
simply based on the title “illegal” rather than the relationship and
connection with the community emphasized in its cited authority.273
To clarify the Fourth Circuit’s incorrect analysis: the court first relied
on an expanded interpretation of Heller, then focused on the Heller
language of law-abiding citizens to interpret “the people” in the Second
266

Id.
Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 17.
268
See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974, 976–77 (4th Cir. 2012).
269
Id. at 980.
270
Id. at 979.
271
Id. at 980.
272
See id. at 979 (emphasizing that the Second Amendment is not tied to individuals declared as
“unvirtuous citizens,” those who are not a law-abiding member of the community, but fails to
acknowledge a law-abiding non-citizen in its analysis).
273
Id. at 980.
267
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Amendment, to ultimately conclude that undocumented individuals are noncitizens and not law-abiding because they hold the title of “illegal.” The
Fourth Circuit’s approach is a complete misapplication of precedent and
incorrectly applies the historical traditions this country was founded upon.
First, the “law-abiding citizenry” test the court applied did not consider the
historical relationship between this class of individuals and the community.
Specifically, it must be clear that “the founders’ notion of citizenship was
less rigid than ours, largely tied to the franchise, which itself was often
based on little more than a period of residence and being a male with some
capital.”274 Second, the position that undocumented individuals are not
law-abiding simply based on a title is an improper categorization that is
prejudicial and inaccurate. Because whatever the class or title illegal aliens
hold and belong to, these individuals are surely a part of “the people,”
capable of being law-abiding, and must be afforded the protections of the
Second Amendment.
Indeed, the text of the Constitution implies
“protection[s] for [aliens] in the way it distinguishes citizens, persons, and
the people.”275 This country has an established tradition of distinguishing
between alien enemies from alien friends,276 and the Fourth Circuit’s focus
on a classification title is improper with far-reaching implications on
individuals who are already considered part of “the people” under our
Constitution.
Disregarding the other circuits holdings that illegal aliens and non-U.S.
citizens are not part of “the people,” the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit
to correctly interpret and extend the protections of the Second Amendment
to this class of individuals. The key component of the decision was the
criticism of the other circuits’ unsound assumption that the terms “the
people” and “citizen” must equate to the same meaning. This per se
exclusion of illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens cannot be justified by
Supreme Court precedent and the historical traditions of this country. Also,
the Seventh Circuit did not engage in an overly broad interpretation of
Heller and rebuked the notion of a citizenry only Second Amendment right.
The primary flaw in each of these earlier circuits is the fact that each court
selected indistinct parts of the Heller opinion to justify their positions.
When in fact, looking at the Heller opinion as a whole, other language of
the decision actually supports the opposite result. Specifically, Heller
recognized the similarities of the phrase “the people” found in the Second

274

United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 2
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 839–43 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007)).
275
Moore, supra note 12, at 810.
276
Id.; see also United States v. Chase, 281 F. 2d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 1960) (emphasizing, “[T]he
Constitution is for the despicable as well as for the admirable”).
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Amendment and the First and Fourth Amendments, which suggests that the
identical phrasing must be interpreted the same throughout.277 Indeed,
nothing suggests that our framers intended this entitlement to be a citizen
only pre-existing right.
The Meza-Rodriguez court also correctly respected the fact that the
term “citizen” appears in other distinct parts of the Constitution compared
to “the people” within the Bill of Rights. Therefore, these terms must not
be treated as synonymous when each term has been distinctly used in
different clauses of the Constitution.278 The distinct uses of the terms
“citizens” and “non-citizens” is “constitutionally important in no less than
[eleven] instances in a political document noted for its brevity.”279 These
distinct uses suggest that the extension of the Bill of Rights was to reach
further than the ordinary citizen. Specifically, the Bill of Rights makes no
mention of “citizen” and focuses on the broader terms of “people” and
“persons.”280 The framers’ conscious avoidance to not encompass the term
“citizen” in the Bill of Rights must be interpreted that the drafters conveyed
a purpose to extend these rights to a broader class of individuals.281
Furthermore, there is wide-spread criticism related to the case-by-case
analysis courts may undergo to apply the substantial connections test;
however, this criticism remains unanswered as the Supreme Court has only
once attempted to define “the people” within the Bill of Rights. Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Verdugo-Urquidez, declared that the “precise
contours” of the test remain unclear and criticized the interchangeable
references of “sufficient connections,” “substantial connections,” and
“accepting societal obligations” when applying these tests to make a
determination of whether an illegal alien or a non-U.S. citizen is part of “the
people.”282 Although courts will continue to be confronted with these
difficult questions, they must recognize that the Supreme Court has
established precedent, one that was textually incorporated in Heller, to
interpret the identical phrasing of “the people” within the First, Second, and
Fourth Amendments the same way. Courts must respect the fact that
Verdugo-Urquidez addressed the specific question of defining “the people”
and observed the principles of fundamental fairness. Specifically, the Bill
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United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2015).
See Cole, supra note 255, at 368 (writing, “[b]ecause the Constitution expressly limits to
citizens only the rights to vote and to run for federal elective office, equality between non-nationals and
citizens would appear to be the constitutional rule”).
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Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Moore, supra note 12, at 806.
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United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 282–83 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of Rights protections extend beyond the citizenry.283
As Second
Amendment jurisprudence continues to develop, courts should limit their
interpretation of Heller and focus on the undisturbed constitutional
interpretation of “the people.”
Although the Seventh Circuit decision was in direct conflict with other
circuits, the application of the substantial connection test to the Second
Amendment is the only appropriate interpretation of how to define “the
people.” Supreme Court precedent and scholars have made it clear that the
Heller decision was the first in-depth consideration of the Second
Amendment and therefore, a broad interpretation should not be basis for a
full-fledged prohibition on all members of a class. Ultimately, relying on
Justice Scalia’s amorphous references to “citizens” or “law abiding
members” regarding “the people” is not a sufficient basis to restrict
constitutional rights of non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens.284 Courts
addressing a Second Amendment challenge must look to the Heller
decision as a whole, and not one phrase or word at a time. The MezaRodriguez court correctly distinguished the purported individual right issue
answered in Heller versus the specific question of defining “the people”
within the Second Amendment. With little precedent in clearly defining
“the people,” courts must look to Verdugo-Urquidez and apply the
substantial connections test as opposed to a complete prohibition based on
dicta and unspecified fear and prejudice of non-U.S. citizens and illegal
aliens possessing firearms.
CONCLUSION
Heller and McDonald are landmark decisions that exacerbated
confusion of gun laws throughout the United States.285 But it is clear what
these cases did not do, they did not strip away the Second Amendment
protections of non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens.286 In fact, the Seventh
Circuit correctly held that the term “the people” has the same meaning
throughout the Bill of Rights287 and thus, non-U.S. citizens and illegal
aliens are afforded the protections when the Verdugo-Urquidez substantial
connections test is satisfied. Ultimately, the Verdugo-Urquidez is the
primary standard to determine who is among “the people” protected by the
283

Id. at 282.
See United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 2012).
285
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Guns and Membership in the American Polity, 21 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 619, 622 (2012).
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Blair, supra note 109, at 190.
287
See Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 664.
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Bill of Rights.288 Therefore, the Second Amendment right to bear arms
must not be stripped away based on erroneous interpretations of Heller
dicta.289 The opposing circuits’ decisions require considerable revision
because precedent and historical traditions clearly exemplify that gun
ownership is not connected to citizenship status.290
With the tragic events and the related gun debate, Congress may
choose to enact reasonable restrictions upon these individuals. However,
the restrictions must undergo a strict analysis of the right at issue and the
“prohibitions which that right has long accommodated.”291 The Second
Amendment’s individual right discussion raises tensions, and even
contradictions, but non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens have developed
deeply ingrained ties and are entitled to constitutional protections.292 These
cases are bigger than the mere possession of a gun, they are about
fundamental fairness for those who are protected by the Bill of Rights.
Depriving a class of individuals of a fundamental right, based on an
overly broad extension of dicta, warrants considerable reconsideration
because non-U.S. Citizens and illegal aliens “are protected by the nation’s
core foundational and governing document.”293 These individuals must be
able to utilize their right to bear arms consistent with the original political
understanding of the Second Amendment, to protect and maintain the
integrity of this nation.294 Beginning with the founding of this country,
non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens have developed and maintained
substantial connections with this country, but often fail to obtain the title of
“legal” or “citizen.” The title of “citizen” is the most cherished and
proudest accomplishment of millions of immigrants who enter this country.
However, the title of U.S. citizen should not be the centerpiece for their
inclusion to the Second Amendment.
The specific identity of “the people” within the Second Amendment
has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court; however, with reliance on
decisions of the Court, the constitutional phrase “the people” does not only
extend to citizens, but history and precedent clearly incorporates illegal
aliens and non-U.S. citizens as part of “the people” of this country.295 This
288

Blair, supra note 109, at 190.
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290
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291
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293
Id.
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“cycle of citizen paranoia and alien fear” will continue to plague these
unauthorized individuals and infringes on their essential right to protect
themselves and family.296 We must accept that our country has always and
will continue to afford the people within our borders the protections of the
United States Constitution.

(2003) (writing, “History strongly suggests that the use of the word “people” . . . was not in any way
intended to exclude noncitizens from the rights safeguarded therein”).
296
Aliens with Guns, supra note 294, at 919.

